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ENTERPRISE BREAKUPS AND PERFORMANCE DURING THE
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Abstract—Using firm-level data, we estimate the effects of the major
wave of 1991 breakups of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises on the
subsequent performance of the “master enterprises” and spun-off divi-
sions. We estimate the performance effects of spinoffs by comparing the
performance of enterprises that remained intact throughout the 1990–1992
period to the performance of the master enterprises that experienced
spinoffs and the newly spun-off subsidiaries. Our estimates suggest that
the breakups had a significant immediate effect on the productive effi-
ciency and on the profitability of industrial firms in 1991, and that the
effect became much less significant in 1992. The effect is a negative
function of the size of the spinoff, being positive for small to slightly
above average-sized spinoffs and negative for very large ones. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that the estimated effect was identical for the
spun-off subsidiaries and the master enterprises that experienced the
spinoffs. Our 1991 estimates suggest that the large firms created under the
centrally planned system suffered from inefficiencies that were alleviated
by the breakups. The 1992 estimates are consistent with increased com-
petition and the appropriation of profits by managers.
I. Introduction
AS the central and eastern European (CEE) countriesembarked on the transition from a planned to a market
economy in the early 1990s, the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) became a major policy issue.
From the standpoint of altering the size and number of firms
and bringing in new management, one of the most important
forms of restructuring observed during the CEE transition
was the massive breakup of SOEs in Czechoslovakia and, to
a lesser extent, in Hungary in the early 1990s. In Czecho-
slovakia, many divisions (subsidiaries) of SOEs applied to
their supervisory ministries for permission to break away
from their “master enterprise” in the 1990–1991 period. The
ensuing process of negotiations among government offi-
cials, top managers of the SOEs, and divisional managers
resulted in a phenomenal wave of spinoffs, giving rise to a
large number of new firms led by new top management. In
particular, although Czechoslovakia started in 1990 with
approximately 700 industrial enterprises (those employing
more than 25 workers), by mid-1992 the number of indus-
trial firms in this category had virtually tripled to approxi-
mately 2000.1 This restructuring preceded other major re-
forms, as prices were still under state control in 1990; even
in 1991, when prices were by and large free, the state still
owned the firms.2
The important question that arises is whether the break-
ups had systematic economic effects by improving or wors-
ening the performance of the spun-off subsidiaries and/or
the remaining master enterprises. We address this issue by
analyzing 1990–1992 enterprise-level data that relate to the
breakups of Czechoslovak SOEs during the 1990–1991
period.3 Because the Czech and Slovak republics are among
the leading transition economies whose policies have been
followed by other countries (World Bank, 1996)—and be-
cause the two republics have displayed major problems with
management’s appropriation of profit in the presence of
weak ownership and legal frameworks (Lizal, Singer, &
Svejnar, 1995; Ellerman, 1998; Weiss & Nikitin, 1998;
Stiglitz, 1999)—our findings are of general interest in the
transition context.
II. A Conceptual Framework for Spinoffs
and Breakups
The literature on the desirability of takeovers, mergers, and
breakups of firms in market economies focuses on the
tradeoff between transaction costs via markets and the
internal inefficiencies within organizations.4 In the context
of the transition, the conceptually more relevant studies
focus on the bargaining between the key decision-makers
who, depending on the context, are managers, government
officials (politicians), workers, and new private owners.5
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1 The latter number includes newly created firms. However, because
only firms with more than 25 employees are included, most of the growth
in the number of firms has been brought about by the breakups of SOEs.
It should also be noted that the breakup of firms in the transition
economies has other aspects than those that we study in this paper. For
instance, the process includes the unbundling of social-service activities
(such as clinics and kindergartens) and service activities for the workforce
(such as food and beverage manufacture and holiday homes). These
spinoffs generate small firms (often with fewer than 25 workers) that
operate in industries other than the core activity of the firm. Although
important, they are not the subject of our analysis.
2 Yet, as discussed by Kotrba (1995) and Zemplinerova and Stibal
(1995), the outcome of the process of enterprise breakups had important
implications for the structure of industry and the subsequent program of
privatization.
3 We build on previous work (Lizal et al., 1995) by using a better data
set and superior analytical techniques to address the issue.
4 See, for example, Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Wil-
liamson (1975, 1985), Chandler (1990), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian
(1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), Raven-
scraft and Scherer (1987), Hart and Moore (1990), Kaplan and Weisbach
(1992), and Radner and van Zandt (1992).
5 See, for example, Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess (1994), Shleifer and
Vishny (1994), Prasnikar et al. (1994), and Lizal et al. (1995).
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In the case of Czechoslovakia, the principal factors lead-
ing to the 1990–1991 breakups of SOEs appear to have been
the goals of the opportunities open to the top management
of the SOEs and the management of the divisions of these
SOEs. In particular, managers of many divisions of SOEs
applied to the supervisory ministries for permission to spin
off from their master enterprises. The government displayed
a relatively passive posture toward the restructuring and
breakups of SOEs, because the ministries were charged with
screening rather than initiating the spinoffs. Moreover, be-
cause the majority of applications for spinoffs were submit-
ted and processed in the last quarter of 1990 and the first
quarter of 1991, the ministries worked under time con-
straints and had little time to encourage applications.6 The
institutional information hence suggests that breakups and
spinoffs were initiated by the management of either the
master enterprise or the subsidiary.
In conceptualizing the process, note that the compensa-
tion of the top management of the firm before the breakup
is an increasing function of performance of the entire firm,
although after the split it is a positive function of the
performance of only the remaining master enterprise. Anal-
ogously, the compensation of the management of a subsid-
iary before the breakup is an increasing function of perfor-
mance of the entire firm, adjusted for the relative
importance of the subsidiary, but it becomes a positive
function of the performance of the subsidiary after the split.
Rational behavior of managers in this setting yields two
competing hypotheses:
1. Breakups occur because the top managers of the SOEs
discard poorly performing divisions to improve the
performance of the (remaining) master enterprises.
2. Breakups are observed because managers of the divi-
sions (subsidiaries) of SOEs spin more-efficient units
away from the master enterprises.
Because firms created under communism tended to be
artificially large, we also examine a third hypothesis that the
SOEs suffered from inefficiencies such as diseconomies of
scale and that the performance of the constituent units could
be improved by unbundling:
3. Breakups occur because the large SOEs suffer from
inefficiencies such as diseconomies of scale, and
breakups result in a superior performance of both the
spun-off units and the remaining master enterprises.
Finally, we allow for a fourth hypothesis that, as govern-
ment supervision of management waned and control over
management remained weak in the absence of a solid legal
framework, appropriation of profit and asset stripping by
managers (“tunneling”) has become a serious problem:
4. Breakups occur because managers of subsidiaries
benefit from being the top management of a firm even
if their unit and the master enterprise perform worse
as a result of the breakup.
In this fourth scenario the utility of managers of divisions
does not depend on the performance of their firms, and the
pursuit of managerial goals worsens enterprise perfor-
mance.
The four hypotheses hence provide a rationale for observ-
ing the following four outcomes:
1. The effect of a breakup on performance is positive for
the master enterprise and negative for the subsidiary
(hypothesis 1).
2. The effect is positive for the subsidiary and negative
for the master firm (hypothesis 2).
3. The effect is positive for both the master enterprise
and the subsidiary (hypothesis 3).
4. The effect is negative for both units (hypothesis 4).
The magnitude of the effects implied by hypothesis 1
through 4 of course depend upon the overall economic
environment. An important countervailing effect is brought
about by increased competition stemming from the break-
ups of large firms with monopolistic power and from the
opening up of the formerly planned economies to world
trade. In particular, increased competition exerts downward
pressure on output prices and thus reduces nominal value
added and profits. Moreover, the Czechoslovak authorities
eliminated quantitative import restrictions as early as 1990,
and the average level of trade-weighted tariffs became as
low as 5% (Drabek & Smith, 1995). However, in 1990–
1991, the firms in Czechoslovakia were temporarily pro-
tected by a uniform 20% import surcharge tax (Dyba &
Svejnar, 1995). Trade with Western economies experienced
a phenomenal boom and, by mid-1990, exceeded the value
of trade with the former Soviet bloc countries (Dyba &
Svejnar, 1995). Thus, one may expect that the combined
effect of the breakups of monopoly firms and the 1992
elimination of the 20% import surcharge would reduce any
positive impact of breakups on value added and profits in
1992 as compared to the immediate effect observed in 1991.
We take these effects into account as we interpret our
econometric estimates.
III. The Empirical Analysis
A. The Data and Identification of Breakups
Our empirical analysis is based on quarterly and annual
data reported by firms to Czechoslovakia’s Federal Statisti-
cal Office and Ministry of Finance during the 1990–1992
6 During this time period, the ministry employees were themselves being
screened as to whether they had belonged to the communist “nomencla-
tura” or had worked for the former security police. They were thus under
extreme pressure not to transgress their narrowly defined duties.
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period. The data cover all industrial enterprises that employ
more than 25 employees.
Although carefully assembled, the data set contains no
explicit indicator of the breakups because no unplanned
changes of industrial structure were expected under central
planning. In order to identify the breakups, we exploited a
special feature of statistical reporting. The system required
enterprises to report the preceding year’s values of variables
together with the current values. Moreover, enterprises ex-
periencing spinoffs were required to report preceding-year
values corresponding to the remaining (postbreakup) part of
the enterprise. If a breakup occurred, the remaining master
enterprise therefore reported both the current and preceding
year’s data corresponding to its new (smaller) size. Using
quarter-by-quarter comparisons, we identified the breakups
and the quarter of their occurrence.7
Using the quarterly and monthly data, we are able to
identify 476 enterprises that were present in the data set
from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 1992.
We dropped approximately 80 of these 476 firms because
they provided inadequate information; and some observa-
tions were also lost as we collected data for the same set of
firms for 1992. Overall, in most regressions, we are able to
use data for 373 firms for 1991 and 262 firms for 1992.
Using the above-mentioned procedure for identifying
spinoffs, eliminating firms that did not adequately fill out
questionnaires and ignoring potential spinoffs involving less
than 5% of the labor force or fewer than five employees, we
were able to identify 152 firms that experienced spinoffs.
Most (78) of these spinoffs occurred in the first quarter of
1991, 57 occurred in the last quarter of 1990, and few
occurred in the second quarter of 1990 and in the remaining
quarters of 1991. We use data from firms that experienced
spinoffs in the first quarter of 1991. By doing so, we resolve
the problem of endogeneity of regressors because we use
1990 values as exogenous variables for the 1991 and 1992
regressions. Of the 78 spinoffs that occurred in the first
quarter of 1991, 66 yielded data that could be used in our
analysis in 1991, and at least fifty generated data that could
be used for 1992.
Although the above data exercise allows us to compare
the performance of master enterprises that experienced
spinoffs to the performance of those that did not, it does not
permit us to link the spun-off units to their former master
enterprises or to estimate the effect on the spun-off units. To
be able to do so, we carried out puzzle-like comparisons of
the values of variables, such as the number of employees in
the newly established companies with the decrease in the
value of these variables in the master enterprises that were
identified as experiencing spinoffs. To generate a meaning-
ful number of observations, we were also forced to impose
the assumption that the spun-off units operate in the same or
similar industry as their master enterprises. This enabled us
to identify 28 pairs of masters and spun-off subsidiaries, 27
of which were usable in our work.8
B. The Econometric Models
The comparisons of means indicate that, in 1990, there
were no significant differences in performance between
firms that later experienced spinoffs and those that did not,9
and so our empirical strategy is to estimate the performance
effect of a spinoff by comparing the performance of enter-
prises that were present throughout the 1990–1992 period
but did not experience any spinoffs to the performance of
the master enterprises that did experience spinoffs and also
to the newly spun-off subsidiaries. The method amounts to
comparing the performance of a treatment group (those
enterprises involved in a breakup) to a control group (those
enterprises not involved in a breakup). It goes beyond a
simple comparison of means by controlling for the relevant
prespinoff conditions in these firms.
Enterprise performance, , may be measured in a number
of ways. To provide a relatively broad set of tests, we have
used three performance indicators: value added/labor,10
profit/labor, and turnover/total cost, where turnover/total
cost  (revenue  cost)/cost  1  (profit  cost)/cost 
2  profit/cost constitutes an alternative measure of the
profitability of the firm.
Profitability is the traditional and most widely used mea-
sure of performance. We use two alternative measures—one
direct (scaled by labor) and one indirect (scaled by total
cost)—to check how sensitive the findings are to these
different measures of performance. At least two reasons
justify also using value added per worker as a performance
variable. First, value added per worker is a measure of
productive efficiency of the firm when we analyze the
impact of breakups on value added per worker, while
controlling for variables that approximate an arbitrary pro-
duction function. In this sense, our analysis may be seen as
testing the impact of breakups on productive efficiency.
Second, value added per worker is traditionally assumed to
be one of the likely objective functions of labor-managed
firms (Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970; Prasnikar et al., 1994).
Because worker-insiders are widely believed to have gained
influence in enterprises during the transition (Blanchard,
1997; Burda, 1993) and microevidence indicates that they
7 An example showing the identification of breakups may be found in
Lizal et al. (1995).
8 See Lizal et al. (1995) for details. Note, also, that data problems related
to the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the completion of the first
wave of privatization have prevented us from extending our panel beyond
1992.
9 Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) have found that poorly performing firms
are more likely to change ownership. However, as was pointed out by
Stiglitz (p. 682 in discussion to Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987)) Lichten-
berg and Siegel have a biased sample because the results are conditioned
on the fact that the firm has survived in the sample: that is, it was not
closed down because of inferior performance. Our sample does not suffer
from this flaw because there were no shutdowns in Czechoslovakia in the
period under study.
10 The data sets did not contain ready measures of value added, and so
we have constructed a proxy for it by adding profit and labor costs.
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tend to appropriate a significant portion of value added
(Prasnikar & Svejnar, 1998), an analysis of the impact of
breakups on value added per worker is useful as it measures
the impact on what is arguably an important objective of the
firm.
The performance variables are based on 1991 and 1992
annual data and the effect of the split can be captured by
allowing the expected future performance to be a function
of two sets of arguments:
Eafter split
 spinoff characteristicspre-spinoff characteristics,
where the spinoff characteristics capture the effect of the
split, and the pre-spinoff characteristics are 1990 firm-
specific indicators that represent the available information
from which the expectations of a future performance of the
enterprise might be inferred.
Because the effect on performance may vary with the size
of the spinoff, we estimate the spinoff effect as a linear
function of the size of the spinoff. In particular, using data
on the spun-off subsidiaries and master enterprises that
experienced breakups as well as those that did not, we
estimate coefficients 0, 1, and vector  in the following
model:
i  Xi  0di  1dfi  ei, (1)
where index i denotes firms,
i is a measure of enterprise performance,
Xi are variables controlling for pre-spinoff conditions,
di is a dummy variable coded 1 if the enterprise is a
spun-off subsidiary or a master firm that experienced a
spinoff and 0 otherwise,
dfi is the share that the labor force of the spun-off
subsidiary represents in the total labor force of the
master enterprise before the breakup, and
the values of di and dfi are 0 for firms that did not
experience spinoffs.
The average, minimum, and maximum values of dfi are
reported in table 1.
If the unobserved random characteristics of an enterprise
did not influence the occurrence of a spinoff and the value
of dfi, ordinary least squares (OLS) would generate consis-
tent estimates of the ’s and vector . However, the process
of determining di and dfi is most likely correlated with
unobserved characteristics of the enterprise, such as the
ability of management and level of technical skill. As a
result, it is likely that
Eeidi  0, Eeidfi  0. (2)
The error term in equation (1) is hence likely to be corre-
lated with di and dfI, and OLS estimates are likely to be
inconsistent. The solutions for this problem are well known
(Maddala, 1983; Heckman & Singer, 1985), with the sim-
plest and most robust one being the use of instrumental
variables (IVs) in which the instruments for di and dfi are
variables that are correlated with di and dfi but not with ei.
In theory, maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) is more
efficient, but, in the presence of the dummy and share
variables, MLE requires numerical integration and is sensi-
tive to misspecification. Moreover, because the relative
advantage of the MLE method is based on large sample
properties and we have 400 or fewer observations, we use
the more robust IV approach.
Our vector of control variables, Xi, consists of the fol-
lowing variables: labor (number of employees), labor
squared, net capital, net capital squared, net capital per
labor, net capital per labor squared, and industry dummy
variables for seven industry groups (heavy industry; ma-
chinery; production of building materials; production of
pulp, wood processing, and paper; glass and ceramics; food
and beverages; and textile and leather). We thus use a
simple but flexible additive form that represents a second-
order approximation to any production function. Because
we are using 1990 Xis, we do not encounter the problem of
endogeneity that would arise if we used current period
(1991 and 1992) values of Xis. In fact, in 1990 the values of
Xis were still determined by the central plan. Both the
spun-off subsidiaries and all the master enterprises were
thus assigned as exogenous control variables the 1990
values of Xis that correspond to the enterprise from which
they evolved.













Entire sample 1990 31.1% 17.0% 118/432 5.3% 70.8%
Analyzed in 1991 28.3% 15.6% 66/373 5.3% 68.2%













(Subsidiaries) 28.7% 15.0% 27 8.1% 70.8%
The size of a spinoff is measured as a percentage of the labor force of the master enterprise.
The number of enterprises in the 1992 regressions varies because of the unavailability of data for some variables.
The size of a spun-off subsidiary is measured as a percentage of the labor force of the former master enterprise.
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In instrumenting di and dfi, the crucial source of identi-
fication is a set of six dummy variables for the individual
supervisory ministries that made the final decisions about
the proposed spinoffs (Federal Ministry of the Economy;
Czech Ministries of Industry, Machinery, and Construction;
and the Slovak Ministries of Economy and Industry). The
six ministries were independent of one another, and their
decisions were fairly idiosyncratic. Moreover, by 1991, the
ministries were relaxing their supervisory functions and had
only limited information about the current and future per-
formance of the firms. Yet, because the ministries decided
whether the split was to be approved or not and how exactly
it was going to be carried out, the ministry dummy variables
are correlated with—and hence are good predictors of—the
variables measuring the occurrence and share of the
spinoff.11 Because the ministries were separate for the
Czech and Slovak republics, the ministry dummy variables
also serve as dummy variables for the two republics.
C. Empirical Results
The Effects of Breakups on Master Enterprises: In this
section, we present coefficient estimates of equation (1)
based on data from master enterprises that experienced
spinoffs and those that did not. The results are based on
samples with 373 firm-level observations in 1991 and ap-
proximately 260 observations in 1992. Approximately 20%
of these firms experienced a spinoff.
In table 2, we present the estimated IV coefficients 0 and
1, with the upper half of the table containing the estimates
for 1991 and the bottom half for 1992. As may be seen from
table 2, all three estimates of 0 and 1 for 1991 are
statistically significant. The performance effect declines
with the size of the spinoff, being positive for small,
medium-sized, and slightly above average-sized spinoffs,
but becoming negative for those that are significantly above
average in size. As we show in column c of table 2, the size
of spinoff at which the effect turns from positive to negative
(38% for value added per worker, 52% for profit per worker,
and 50% for turnover/cost) exceeds the average spinoff size
of 30% reported in table 1.12 The results thus suggest that,
in the short run, master enterprises that experienced small to
slightly above average spinoffs gained in terms of both
efficiency and profitability—a finding that is consistent with
hypotheses 1 and 3 of section II. In contrast, firms that lost
more than 38% of their labor force through a spinoff
suffered in terms of value added per worker. Those that lost
more than 50% of their labor in the spinoff also experienced
a negative effect in terms of profit/labor and turnover/cost.
Because we are measuring the effect immediately after the
breakup, a possible explanation of the negative impact of
large spinoffs (1 	 0) is that they necessitate more funda-
11 The correlations between industry dummies used in the Xi vector of
control variables and the ministry dummies that identify the effect of the
spinoff variables are fortunately quite low. Although in one industry, the
correlation coefficient reaches 0.78, but all other correlation coefficients
are below 0.4.
12 The size at which the effect changes from positive to negative may be
referred to as the “critical size” of the spinoff. In our case, it is measured
in terms of the labor share of the master enterprise that experienced a
spinoff. As may be seen from the calculated values in tables 2 through 4,
the 1991 estimates of the critical size of the spinoff range from 38% to
52% for master firms, 31% to 34% for spun-off subsidiaries, and 34% to
45% for the joint estimates. The effect of the spinoff is thus estimated to
be positive within a sizable range of spinoff values, including the average
spinoff size of approximately 30% (table 1).
TABLE 2.—ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF A BREAKUP ON MASTER FIRMS
Dependent
Variable
IV Coefficients and Statistics
0 1 c [%] R2 N
1991
Value added/labor 206.04** 
542.10** 38.0*** 0.40 373
(97.59) (251.19) (8.1)
Profit/labor 375.27** 
722.90* 51.9*** 0.22 373
(175.91) (382.10) (12.4)
Turnover/cost 0.74** 
1.49* 49.5*** 0.08 373
(0.32) (0.78) (11.5)
1992
Value added/labor 167.07 
499.67 33.4 0.21 259
(265.79) (545.20) (27.2)
Profit/labor 165.84 







Estimated equation: i  Xi  0di  1dfi  ei,
Values in parentheses are standard errors.
c  critical size of the spinoff, defined as the size (percentage of the labor force of the original master enterprise) at which the effect of the spinoff on performance is 0; that is, c  
(0/1)  100%.
N  number of observations.
*  significantly different from 0 at a 10% level of significance.
**  significantly different from 0 at a 5% level of significance.
***  significantly different from 0 at a 1% level of significance.
The sample contains 66 master enterprises that experienced a breakup in the 1991 regressions.
There are 66 master enterprises that experienced a break-up in the samples with 367 observations and 50 in the remaining 1992 regression samples.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS96
mental restructuring than do small spinoffs, with perfor-
mance suffering in the short term during the adjustment
process.13
The estimates reported in the bottom panel of table 2 refer
to 1992, and, for value added and profit per worker, they are
based on a smaller sample than are those for 1991, because
approximately 30% of firms did not report data on labor in
1992. As is evident from table 2, although in the case of
value added and profit per worker the estimated 1992
coefficients have the same signs as those for 1991, the
estimated standard errors are relatively large and the esti-
mated effects are statistically insignificant. The decline in
statistical significance of the negative effect of large
spinoffs (1 	 0) between 1991 and 1992 is consistent with
the above-mentioned explanation that large spinoffs neces-
sitated more fundamental (and, hence, costly) restructuring
in 1991 and that this negative effect on performance might
have tapered off by 1992. The question that remains, how-
ever, is why the effect becomes statistically insignificant
between 1991 and 1992 for spinoffs of all sizes. We have
pursued this issue by checking if the decrease in statistical
significance of the estimates of 0 and 1 between 1991 and
1992 is caused by a decrease in the sample size or by other
phenomena. To do so, we have reestimated the 1991 value
added/labor and profit/labor regressions using only data
from those firms that constitute the 1992 sample. The
resulting estimates have the same signs as those in table 2,
with three of the four estimates being statistically insignif-
icant. Thus, these findings indicate that the decrease in the
sample size could be the cause of decline in statistical
significance observed in table 2 between 1991 and 1992.
In contrast, the 1992 estimates for turnover/cost, reported
in the bottom panel of table 2, are based on a very similar
number of observations as the 1991 estimates reported in
the upper panel of the table. For this indicator, the issue of
a reduced sample size does not arise, and the insignificance
of the 1992 estimates of the effect of the breakups is
attributable to other phenomena, such as increased compe-
tition and dissipation of profits by management (hypothe-
sis 4).
Effects of a Spinoff on the Subsidiary: In this subsec-
tion, we focus on the difference between the performance of
spun-off subsidiaries and enterprises that did not experience
spinoffs. The total sample size is approximately the same as
before (334 observations for all three indicators in 1991, and
224 observations for value added and profit per worker in
1992), but there are only 27 observations on the spun-off
subsidiaries in 1991 and, in the case of value added and
profit per worker, only 12 in 1992.
In the upper half of table 3, we present the estimated
effects for 1991. As was the case for master enterprises that
experienced spinoffs, we find that the estimated effects of a
spinoff on the newly independent subsidiary’s value added
per worker, profit per worker, and the ratio of turnover to
cost are statistically significant, with 0  0 and 1 	 0. The
1991 estimates, hence, again yield the performance effect as
a negative function of the relative size of the spinoff, with
the effect being positive for small to average-sized spinoffs
(consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3) and negative for above
average-sized spinoffs (consistent with the explanation
based on sizable adjustment costs).
The estimates for 1992, reported in the bottom half of
table 3, show the effect to be negatively related to the size
of the spinoff (0  0 and 1 	 0) for profit/labor and
insignificant (0  1  0) for value added/labor and
turnover/cost. Thus, there is again evidence of a weakening
13 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out this
explanation to us. A competing explanation would be that sizable breakups
created strongly competing firms that drove down product prices, nominal
value added, and profits. However, as we show presently, this latter
explanation is not supported by the weakening of the effect in 1992.
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF A BREAKUP ON THE SUBSIDIARIES
Dependent
Variable
IV Coefficients and Statistics
0 1 c[%] R2 N
1991
Value added/labor 225.57* 
732.54* 30.8*** 0.18 334
(123.44) (385.70) (6.2)
Profit/labor 434.72** 
1375.61** 31.6*** 0.09 334
(210.50) (588.16) (5.9)
Turnover/cost 1.31** 
3.81*** 34.3*** 0.00 334
(0.53) (1.48) (4.5)
1992
Value added/labor 201.17 
713.58 28.2 0.15 224
(468.67) (1399.9) (19.4)
Profit/labor 1230.90* 
3717.06** 33.1*** 0.02 224
(646.24) (1894.59) (4.7)
Turnover/cost 0.64 
3.33 19.3 0.00 324
(0.77) (2.09) (12.3)
Notes are the same as for table 2 except:
there are 27 subsidiaries in the sample for the 1991 regressions.
there are 22 subsidiaries in the sample with 324 observations and 12 subsidiaries in the sample with 224 observations for the 1992 regressions.
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effect of spinoffs over time, but the weakening is less
uniform than in the case of the master enterprises. Taken
together, the 1991 and 1992 results in table 3 are consistent
with the explanation that more sizable breakups cause more
substantial short-term adjustment costs and hence have a
negative effect on performance in the short run. In the case
of profit/labor, this negative effect seems to prevail through
1992. As before, we have reestimated the 1991 value added/
labor and profit/labor regressions using data from only those
firms that are present in the 1992 sample. Unlike the mixed
results that we found for master enterprises that experienced
breakups, the present reestimation generates statistically
significant coefficients that have the same signs and similar
values as those in the upper part of table 3. In the case of the
spun-off subsidiaries, the weakening of statistical signifi-
cance over time thus appears to be brought about by phe-
nomena such as increased competition and the dissipation of
profits by management (hypothesis 4), rather than by re-
duced sample size.
Joint Estimates: In view of the similar estimates ob-
tained for the master firms that experienced spinoffs and for
the spun-off units, we have also performed joint estimation
and tested the hypothesis that spinoffs have equal effects on
these two sets of firms. As may be seen from table 4, the
joint estimates are similar to those found in the separate
regressions for master firms that experienced spinoffs and
for spun-off subsidiaries. Moreover, as the p-values in the
last columns of the tables indicate, on the basis of X(2)2 tests,
one cannot reject the hypothesis that for each performance
indicator the effect of the breakup is identical for the
spun-off subsidiaries and the remaining master firms. The
separate as well as joint 1991 estimates for small, medium,
and slightly above average spinoffs hence provide support
for hypothesis 3 (SOEs suffer from inefficiencies such as
diseconomies of scale, and breakups result in a superior
performance of both the spun-off units and the remaining
master enterprises) as opposed to hypotheses 1 and 2
(breakups occur because either master enterprises or sub-
sidiaries are more efficient).
We have also generated joint 1991 estimates for value
added/labor and profit/labor using only data from firms that
are present in the 1992 sample. These new estimates and the
estimates for turnover/cost in tables 4 show that five of the
six relevant coefficients are statistically significant. These
results hence indicate that the decline in the statistical
significance of the joint estimates between 1991 and 1992 is
brought about primarily by phenomena such as increased
competition and possible dissipation of profits by managers
(hypothesis 4).14
IV. Concluding Observations
In terms of altering the number and size of firms, as well
as bringing in new top management, one of the most
important forms of enterprise restructuring observed in a
number of transition economies was the breakup of the large
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our econometric estimates
suggest that the major wave of SOE breakups that took
place in Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s had a significant
immediate effect on the efficiency and profitability of in-
dustrial firms. The effect was positive for small, medium,
and slightly above average-sized spinoffs but negative for
14 Finally, we have used the 1991 and 1992 data to carry out estimation
on first differences. The estimated coefficients in this fixed-effects spec-
ification are by and large statistically insignificant. We hoped to generate
information from changes of performance over time, but our finding of a
lack of statistical significance is not altogether surprising, given that we
found the 1992 level estimates to have relatively large standard errors and
to be themselves statistically insignificant at conventional statistical test
levels.
TABLE 4.—JOINT ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF A BREAKUP
Dependent
Variable
IV Coefficients and Statistics
0 1 c[%] R2 N p-value
1991
Value added/labor 126.05* 
375.67** 33.6*** 0.46 400 0.43
(65.63) (181.58) (7.8)
Profit/labor 242.83** 
503.78** 42.8*** 0.32 400 0.27
(112.32) (240.84) (11.8)
Turnover/cost 0.53** 






2.0 0.22 274 0.91
(163.67) (423.35) (45.9)
Profit/labor 237.40 





14.5 0.13 389 0.55
(0.28) (0.68) (45.1)
Notes are the same as for table 2 except:
p-value  p-value of the X(2)2 test of the equality of the effects of a spinoff on the subsidiaries and master firms.
The sample contains 27 subsidiaries and 66 master enterprises that experienced a break-up in the 1991 regressions.
There are 22 subsidiaries and 66 master enterprises that experienced a breakup in the sample with 389 observations and 12 subsidiaries and 50 master enterprises experiencing a breakup in the other samples for
the 1992 regressions.
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the very large ones. We also cannot reject the hypothesis
that the estimated effect of spinoffs on performance was
identical for the spun-off subsidiaries and the master enter-
prises that experienced the spinoffs. Taken together, the
positive short-term effects on performance of both the
master firms and the spun-off units are consistent with our
hypothesis 3, namely that the large SOEs suffered from
inefficiencies that were rapidly alleviated by the breakups
into smaller units. The finding that the short-term perfor-
mance effect was negative for very large spinoffs is in turn
consistent with the explanation that sizable breakups caused
large adjustment costs and thus had a negative short-term
effect on performance.
We also find that most 1992 estimates are similar to those
for 1991 but that many yield statistically insignificant ef-
fects, including the negative one for the sizable breakups. To
explain this finding, we first control for the fact that, for two
of the three performance indicators (value added/labor and
profit/labor), we have significantly fewer observations for
1992 than 1991. By reproducing 1991 estimates with data
from firms that are present in only the 1992 sample, we are
able to control for the reduction in sample size and establish
that the weakening of the statistical significance is, in most
cases, not attributable to the decrease in the sample size. We
conclude that the insignificance is likely generated by the
increased competition brought about by the breakups of the
large firms into competing units and the 1992 elimination of
the 20% import surcharge (the main trade protection mea-
sure), as well as by the growing phenomenon of profit
dissipation by management as central controls were gradu-
ally eroded. The latter interpretation reflects hypothesis 4
and is consistent with recent reports of the siphoning off of
profits and asset stripping (“tunneling”) by managers in the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia and other transition econ-
omies with weak ownership structures.
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